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Abstract
This essay explores gender issues in the contemporary application of  Islamic
law in the Muslim majority-states of  northern Nigeria. Brief  political
background helps to explain the shari>‘a codes enacted by the legislatures
of  the states, drawing largely from the classical formulations of  Maliki
school of  Islamic law. Women were among the first to be prosecuted and
sentenced to death by stoning for the offence of  zina>. To provide effective
legal defense for the accused women, their lawyers and activists for women
human rights had to argue in Islamic law before they could convince Shari>‘a
Courts of  Appeal to overturn the sentences of  death by stoning and set the
women free. In the process, women activists learned a lot about the classical
formulations of  Maliki school of  Islamic law, where they discovered the
rich flexibility of Islamic thought, and that has empowered them to
articulate Islamic criticisms against gender bias in the recently enacted shari>‘a
codes.
Keywords:  Gender Issues, Application of  Islamic Law, Maliki School
of Thought, Nigeria
A. Introduction
Fatima Mernissi opens the introduction to her famous book, The
Veil and the Male Elite, with a brief  account of  an episode at her local
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grocery store that encapsulates the problem I address in this essay. She
recounts how her simple question “Can a woman be a leader of
Muslims?” shocked her grocer, and led one customer to invoke God’s
protection against “the catastrophes of  the times.” She adds that a
schoolteacher, the third person in the grocery store at the time, “stood
slowly caressing his wet mint leaves, and then hit me with the hadi>th
that he knew would be fatal: Those who entrust their affairs to a woman
will never know prosperity!’ Silence fell on the scene. There was nothing
I could say.”1  Mernissi describes her reaction thus:
I discretely left the grocery store without another word. What could I
have said to counterbalance the force of that political aphorism, which
is as implacable as it is popular? Silenced, defeated, and furious, I
suddenly felt the urgent need to inform myself  about this hadi>th, and
to search out the texts where it is mentioned, to understand better its
extraordinary power over the ordinary citizens of a modern state.2
The most striking points in this remarkable episode include the
violence that Mernissi suffered when she was hit with a hadi>th that
proved “fatal,” “implacable,” “popular,” and having “force” and
“extraordinary power” not only to silence her, but also to defeat and
humiliate her. Mernissi’s encounter is a clear pointer to wider intellectual
problems of  contemporary Muslims who are debating crucial issues
confronting “ordinary citizens of a modern state.” After she felt
silenced, Mernissi recovered her voice through an intellectual odyssey
into the classics of Islamic intellectual traditions, where she found the
discursive resources that empowered her to demonstrate that the
particular hadi>th she was hit with is in fact a weak hadi>th that, according
to the classical Islamic jurisprudence, can only serve as a conjectural but
not categorical source for deriving rules of  Islamic law that every Muslim
must obey.  For Mernissi, “a study of  the religious texts that everybody
knows but no one really probes,” opens the pathway for her to acquire
the discursive resources she needed to strike back against the negative
consequences of  manipulating sacred texts that constitute “a structural
–––––––––––––––––
1 Fatima Mernissi, The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of  Women’s
Rights in Islam,” translated by Mary Jo Lakeland, (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-
Wesley Publishing Co, 1991), p. 1.
2 Ibid, p. 2.
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characteristic of  the practice of  power in Muslim societies.”3 As Muslim
men found warrant from Islamic intellectual traditions to exclude
women from leadership, Muslim women can also find counter-warrant
in the same traditions for their inclusion in leadership.
A Nigerian illustration of  Mernissi’s predicament shows
remarkable similarities. In analyzing the various reactions to the recent
developments in shari>‘a application in Nigeria, Ayesha Imam observes
that: “The dominant discourse was that to criticize—even in the mildest
ways—the sharia’anization project was to be by definition anti-sharia,
anti-North [predominantly Muslim region of Nigeria], and anti-Islam.”
Criticism of  any aspects attracts accusations of  apostasy, raising the
specter of  death penalty. Ayesha Imam observes that in the “context
of vigilantes and the failure of the state authorities to maintain security
and the rule of  law, these accusations are very real threat, [and they]
raise the likelihood of physical attack, if not actual death.”4 Threat of
vigilante violence has forced some Muslim critics of the shari>‘a project
to recant their earlier skepticisms, and many more to resort to self-
censorship. A report by Human Rights Watch observes that recent
expansion of Islamic law in the northern states of Nigeria has created
a climate unconducive to freedom of  expression, leading to “a form
of self-censorship among critics—including academics, human rights
activists, members of  women’s organizations, lawyers and others—
who were willing to express strong reservations about shari>‘a in private
conversations but not in public.”5 This self-censorship is “based
primarily on a fear of being labeled as anti-Islamic—a charge commonly
labeled against perceived critics of  shari>‘a.” Human Rights Watch
reports further that “the consequences of this self-censorship have
–––––––––––––––––
3 Ibid, pp. 8-9.
4 Ayesha Imam, “Fighting the Political (Ab)Use of Religion in Nigeria:
BOABAB for Women’s Human Rights, Allies and Others,”  in Warning Signs of
Fundamentalisms, edited by A. Imam, J. Morgan & N. Yuval-Davis, published by Women
Living under Muslim Law, 2004) http://www.wluml.org/english/pubsfulltxt.shtml?
cmd%5B87%5D=i-87-98541. p. 128. Accessed on May 24, 2007.
5 Human Rights Watch, (September 2004), “Political Sharia”? Human Rights
and Islamic Law in Northern Nigeria,” Human Rights Watch, volume 16, no 9(A), pp.
86-90.
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been a virtual silence on the part of the northern civil society about
the more controversial aspects of shari>‘a, … and, for a long time, the
absence of  genuine, open public debate on these questions.”6 This
unhealthy intellectual development reveals a remarkable similarity to
Mernissi’s encounter with the problematic of  gender in contemporary
Islamic discourses in Morocco. As in Mernissi’s case, Muslim women
in Nigeria have resorted to invoking the classics of Islamic law in order
to combat gender bias and discrimination in the contemporary
application of  Islamic law—a point analyzed in more details below.
Of  course Mernissi’s predicament is quite common in the
contemporary Islamic discourses taking place in diverse contexts.
Charles Kurzman observes that a central preoccupation in the
discourses of Islamic modernists since the middle of the nineteenth-
century has been the imperative to defend the right to speak on topical
issues of the day from the perspective of Islamic modernism, the Islamic
legitimacy of  which has often been contested.7 The discursive strategy
of emphasizing the inadequacy of traditional categories of Islamic
thought, and urging new ways of rethinking Islam in the modern
world—reiterated by recent thinkers such as Abdullah an-Na’im8 and
Muhammad Arkoun9—are yet to dislodge deeply engrained patterns
of traditional Islamic thought that are sometimes the explicit issues in
contention or the subtext within the debates. An alternative strategy
of recovering selected elements within Islamic classics has so far
marshaled strong arguments that demonstrate the Qur’anic bases for
an Islamic theology of  liberation, the Islamic roots of  democracy, social
pluralism, peace-building, human rights, as well as Islamic warrants
for gender equality.10 This strategy of  excavating Islamic classics for
–––––––––––––––––
6 Ibid, p. 88.
7 Charles Kurzman, ed., Modernist Islam 1840-1940,, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002), pp. 6-20.
8 Abdullah A An-Na’im. Toward an Islamic Reformation, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse
University Press, 1990).
9 Mohammed Arkoun, Rethinking Islam, trans. and ed. by Robert D. Lee,
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); and Mohammed Arkoun, The Unthought in
Contemporary Islamic Thought (London: Saqi, 2002).
10 For example, see: Farid Esack Farid, Qur’an, Liberation and Pluralism, (Rockford,
MA: Oneworld Publications, 1997); Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name,
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warrants to support different positions within the contemporary debates
among Muslims is worthy of further development: it should be
expanded and fortified with equally Islamically authentic rebuttals
against the potentially violent responses with death fatwas and takfi>r.
B. Political Context of Nigeria
International media coverage of application of Islamic law in
contemporary Nigeria rarely pays adequate attention to the complexities
of  the country, most notably its multi-ethnic and multi-religious
composition, and the long grip of  the military on power. Also relevant
are two decades (1980s-1990s) of  implementing World Banks and IMF
structural adjustment programs, whose net outcome has increased
poverty and disillusionment, leaving majority of Nigerians with no
option but seeking solace in primordial identities of ethnicity and
religion. Therefore when the country was preparing return to civilian
rule, politicians found it easier to instrumentalize ethnicity or religion
to mobilize constituencies to vote them into power, without offering
meaningful policies and programs that could salvage the ravages of
both prolonged military rule and structural adjustment programs.
In May of 1999, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo was sworn-in as the
elected president of  Nigeria after nearly two decades of  military rule
dominated by generals, namely: 1) Muhammadu Buhari (r. 1983-1985);
2) Ibrahim Babangida (r. 1985-1993);11 3) Sani Abacha (r.1993 to
–––––––––––––––––
(Oxford, England: Oneworld Publications, 2001); A.S. Moussalli, Islamic Quest for
Democracy, Pluralism, and Human Rights, (Gainesville, FL: U.P. of  Florida, 2001); A.
Sachedina, The Islamic Roots of  Democratic Pluralism, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2001); Abdolkarim Soroush, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: Essential
writings of Abdolkarim Soroush, translated, edited, and with a critical introduction by
Mahmoud Sadri, Ahmad Sadri, (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2000); M.
Shahrur, Dirasat al-Islamiyya al-Mu’asira fi al-Dawla wa al-Mujtama’, (Damascus: Al-Ahli,
1994); Amina Wadud, Qur’an and Woman, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
11 During Babangida’s reign Chief  M.K.O. Abiola, a Yoruba Muslim from the
south-west region together with Alhaji Baba Gana Kingibe a Kanuri Muslim from the
north-east region, were the presumed winners of the annulled elections held on June
12, 1993. Although the elections were thought to be free and fair, Abiola never became
president, and when he declared himself president of Nigeria in 1994, he was arrested
and detained by General Sani Abacha until both of them died in 1998.
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1998);12 and 4) Abdusalami Abubukar (r. 1998-1999), who organized
the elections that brought Chief  Obasanjo to power. These four generals
were all Muslims who hailed from the northern part of Nigeria, an
important issue in the national political discourse during the lead-up
to the 1999 election. Vigorous arguments were articulated to support
the contention that power-shift—from the predominantly Muslim
northern region of the country to the predominantly Christian southern
region—was necessary for national reconciliation after the devastation
of  the two decades of  military rule, and also for breaking the Muslim/
Northern monopoly on power.
Jibrin Ibrahim observes that political mobilization on ethno-
regional basis is not new in Nigerian politics. He dates the first phase
of its evolution to 1958-1965 when the politics of nationalism and
decolonization was “characterized by the mobilization of ethnoregional
identities with the objective of gaining access to regional power, where
significant real power still lay.”13 This phase ended with the Nigerian
civil war c. 1966-1970 that tragically exposed the serious hazards of
ethno-regionalism. The second phase that Jibrin locates in the civil
war period saw efforts “directed toward mobilizing the nation to fight
the civil war and resolve the national crisis”14 that crippled Nigeria’s
first republic c. 1950-1966. In the third and final phase, the politics of
ethno-regionalism was transformed by the rise of  “a unitary state and
consequent weakening of  the regional bases of  power.” Ibrahim
captures the serious consequences in this insightful remark:
The sole issue informing political mobilization then became the conquest
of  federal power at the center. This tendency has been exacerbated
over the past decade, the years of structural adjustment, due to enhanced
centralization, concentration, and reduction [original italics] of the resources
available even at the center. This means that groups are obliged to
block others’ access or to displace those who already have access if
–––––––––––––––––
12 Between August and November 1993, Chief  Shonenkan, a Yoruba Christian
from the south-west, was President of Nigeria and head of interim national government
that was overthrown by General Sani Abacha.
13 Jibrin Ibrahim, “Political Transition, Ethnoregionalism, and the ‘Power Shift’
Debate in Nigeria,” Issue: A Journal of  Opinion, vol. 27:1 (1999), p. 13.
14 Ibid.
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they are to eat from the national cake. Politics has become a zero-sum
game. The discursive categories defining the game are ethnoregional.15
 This observation shows that political and economic issues are
the drivers of the politics of power-shift, while ethnoregionalism is
basically an instrument of  accessing dwindling economic resources
centrally controlled by concentrated political power of the federal
government of Nigeria. It is therefore important to maintain a balanced
perspective on the relative significance of ethno-regional forces—along
with their religious aspects—while focusing analysis on the political
and economic drivers of  Nigerian politics.16 One can even argue that
although the divisive agents of religious and ethno-regional mobilization
have frequently used the rhetoric of threatening secession from the
federation of Nigeria, they have failed to cause the actual break-up of
country despite two concrete attempts, namely: the civil war of 1966-
1970 and Major Okar’s abortive coup of  1990.17 The economic
integration of Nigeria has become strong enough to absolve not only
the tensions from religious and ethno-regional mobilization, but also
the serious strains of  zero-sum politics. Though under-appreciated,
coalition, alliance, and compromise have been significant features of
Nigerian politics that made soft-landing possible out of the volatile
situation of the last years of the military grip on power, especially
under General Sani Abacha.
The strengths of politics of coalition, alliance and compromise
are discernible in the power-shift politics under which Chief Obasanjo
emerged as the consensus candidate acceptable to major political
constituencies for various reasons. The Northern/Muslim power elite
saw Obasanjo as an elder statesman who had the distinguished honor
of being the first and only Nigerian military leader who willingly handed
power to democratically elected President of Nigeria in the person of
Alhaji Shehu Shagari (r. 1979-1983), a prominent member of  the
–––––––––––––––––
15 Ibid.
16 L. Diamond, A. Kirk-Greene, and O. Oyediran, eds. Transition without End:
Nigerian Politics and Civil Society under Babangida,  (Boulder, CO Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1997).
17 For example, see: “The Making , [and] Crushing of a Coup:  A Blow-by-Blow
Account of  Nigeria’s Bloodiest, But Botched Coup,” African Concord,  7 May 1990.
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2007 M/1428 H36
Muhammad S. Umar
northern power elite. As a born-again Christian, Chief Obasanjo was
also a pleasant choice for Nigerian Christians who thought Muslims
had dominated power for too long. The military could not have had
ideological or institutional opposition to a decorated four-star general
and former leader of  Nigeria to assume the same post again. The
international community also welcomed Chief Obasanjo who used to
enjoy moral authority on account of  being the only military ruler who
willingly handed power back to civilians.18 Additionally, Chief  Obasanjo
seems to regard himself as a messiah of Nigeria, declaring that his
election was a “mandate from God to transform Nigeria.”19 Eight years
later at the end of  his two terms in office, and having woefully failed
to amend the constitution so he can have a third term, Chief  Obasanjo
seemed to have lost the overwhelming goodwill and confidence he
had when he took over in May of 1999—a very interesting issue that
cannot be discussed in more details here.
C. Application of Islamic Law in Nigeria
Almost immediately after Nigeria’s return to “democratic rule”
in 1999, serious problems suddenly appeared in the public sphere, and
carried in screaming headlines by news-media around the world. Violent
conflicts linked to ethnic and religious problems frequently manifested
in Muslim-Christian riots, claiming the lives of thousands of innocent
citizens while also traumatizing many more through loss of beloved
relatives, friends, business associates, properties, and other valuable
possessions.20 The religious and ethnic violent conflicts should be
–––––––––––––––––
18 M. Camdessus, “Supporting Nigeria’s recovery: An IMF’s perspective.”
Monday, Abuja, Nigeria, March 22, 1999.
19 General Olusegun Obasanjo, “Nigeria Will Rise Again: The text of  the Address
by General Olusegun Obasanjo, following his election as president of  the Federal
Republic of  Nigeria.” Wednesday March 3, 1999.
20 For example, see the reflections of BBC correspondent in Nigeria, Bernaby
Phillips, “Farewell to Nigeria,” BBC News Online, Sunday, 8 July, 2001, 17:58 GMT
18:58 UK. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own correspondent/
1429159.stm, Accessed on May 26, 2007; Dan  Isaacs, “Islam in Nigeria: Simmering
Tensions,” BBC NEWS: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/3155279.stm,
Published: 2003/09/24 11:01:13 GMT (© BBC MMVI) Accessed March 17, 2006;
Also, Bala Usman, “Violent Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria: Beyond Myths and
Mystifications,” Analysis, vol. 2 No 2, February 2003.
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understood within the travails of Nigeria as a modern nation-state
with multi-ethnic and multi-religious citizenry, the various aspects of
which have been analyzed by several scholars.21
Also grabbing the attention of the international community are
the judgments of Islamic courts condemning women to death by stoning
as legislated in recent enlargement of the scope of Islamic law in Nigeria.
Within the federal structure of  Nigeria, states have constitutional
mandate to enact laws on many local issues, including criminal law.
The elected governor of Zamfara State, Alhaji Ahmed Sani, signed a
law passed by the State Legislative House of Assembly in 2000, thereby
expanding the jurisdiction of Zamfara State Sharia Courts to include
deciding criminal cases according to Islamic law.22 Governor Sani’s
actions in this regard should be seen within the context of identity
politics. Ayesha Imam argues that since Zamfara State has “little
infrastructure, few natural resources, relatively few people with high
formal education…. Governor Sani has to find some way to make
himself  popular. He did it by claiming to undertake shari’anization.”23
Soon afterward, an upsurge of popular support for application of Islamic
–––––––––––––––––
21 For example, see: Eghosa E Osaghae, Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998); Crawford Young, “The Impossible
Necessity of  Nigeria: A Struggle for Nationhood” Foreign Affairs, November/December
1996, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/1996/6.html, and A. Jega ed., Identity
Transformation and Identity Politics under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria (Uppsala: Nordic
Africa Institute, May 2000). Daniel J. Smith, A Culture of  Corruption: Everyday Deception
and Popular Discontent in Nigeria, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
22 For detailed and comparative analysis of the issues involved, see: Ruud Peters,
The Reintroduction of Islamic Criminal Law in Northern Nigeria, A Study Conducted on
Behalf of the European Commission, (Lagos, 2001); Philip Ostien, Jamila M. Nasir, Franz
Kogelman, Comparative Perspectives on Shari’ah in Nigeria, (Ibadan: Spectrum Books,
2005).  Ogbu U. Kalu, “Safiyya and Adamah: Punishing Adultery with Sharia Stones in
the Twenty-First Century Nigeria,” African Affairs, (2003), 102, pp. 389-408; Ibrahim A.
Aliyu, “Shari’a Implementation So Far: Problems and Prospects,” Journal of Islamic and
Comparative Law, vol. 23 (2002), pp. 31-44; Center for the Study of  Islam and Democracy
(CAIS), The Implementation of  Shari’a in a Democracy: The Nigerian Experience, (Washington,
DC 2006), and Vincent O. Nmehielle, “Sharia Law in the Northern States of  Nigeria:
To Implement or Not to Implement, the Constitutionality is the Question,” Human
Rights Quarterly, volume 24 (2004), pp. 730-759.
23 Ayesha Imam, “Fighting the Political (Ab)Use of  Religion in Nigeria,” p. 125.
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law left all the elected governors of states with Muslim majorities with
no option but to demonstrate their serious commitment to applying
Islamic law in their states. Many of  the governors were not willing
initially but when they began to be publicly accosted by angry mobs
questioning their Islamic faith, the strength of popular expectation on
the issue became unmistakable, especially for politicians who face re-
election within couple of  years.24 Political maneuvering around the
popular demands for shari>‘a application became like riding the tiger by
the tail. Even for the governors whose commitments were not in doubt,
there was still the pressure to demonstrate that they meant business.
Shari>‘a has of  course being part of  Nigeria’s legal system for
centuries.25 Even after the imposition of  British colonialism in 1903,
application of shari>‘a continued alongside with British common and
colonial laws.26 Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code were enacted by
the Northern Region of Nigeria at independence from British
colonialism in 1960. While incorporating rules of  Islamic law, these
codes omitted many aspects of  the classical formulations of  fiqh, most
notably the h}udu>d punishments of death by stoning and amputation of
limps. Following the restructuring of  Nigeria after the civil war of
1966-1970, the Northern Region of Nigeria ceased to exist as one
geo-political entity and was replaced by the present-day nineteen states
existing in the same geographic area. These states inherited the old
shari>‘a codes; twelve with Muslim majority populations are the states
that have expanded the jurisdiction of the shari>‘a to include the h}udu>d
punishments—one of the main aspects of all the changes introduced
since 1999. Although wide differences exist among the twelve states,
the older Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Codes have been replaced by
the new ones with h}udu>d provisions. A second set of  legislations has
–––––––––––––––––
24 Sanusi L. Sanusi “Fundamentalist Groups and the Nigerian Legal System:
Some Reflections,” in Warning Signs of  Fundamentalism, p.79-82.
25 Tijjani M. Naniya, “History of the Sharia in Some States of Northern Nigeria
to circa 2000,” Journal of  Islamic Studies, volume 13, (2002), no 1, pp. 14-31.
26 Muhammad S. Umar, Islam and Colonialism: Intellectual Responses of Muslims of
Northern Nigeria to British Colonialism, (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 40-55. Also see: Tijjani,
M. Naniya, “Transformation of  the Administration of  Justice in Kano Emirates,
1903-1966,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Bayero University, Kano, Nigeria, 1990).
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been enacted to reorganize judicial administration, grant shari>‘a courts
autonomy from their present integration into the magistrate courts that
apply common law and Nigerian public law, establish a different
hierarchy of shari>‘a courts, and expand the appellate jurisdiction of
Shari>‘a Courts of  Appeal. Finally, a third set of  legislations has been
passed into law to establish various statutory bodies, such Council of
Ulama, Hisba Commission, Sharia Research Commission, etc.27 It is
very important to note that wide differences exist in the legislations
passed by the each of the 12 sharia-implementing states,28 even though
all the details could not be fully analyzed here. It is equally important
to note that shari>‘a in Nigeria today includes not only these modern
legislative enactments, but also the medieval formulations of  Maliki
fiqh, from which these shari’a codes were drawn, and which is also
invoked in deciding cases in the shari>‘a courts.
D. Gender, Women NGOs, and Application of  Shari>‘a
Among the early cases decided by shari>‘a courts on the basis of
the newly enacted shari>‘a criminal codes were cases of  zina> (illicit sex),
amputation for theft that was carried out in 2001 and one sentence of
80 lashings for zina> by an unmarried woman, but reduced to 40 lashes
when the sentence was executed—both cases were in Zamfara State.
Similarly two judgments of  lashing for zina> by unmarried person and
one for consumption of alcohol were carried out in Malumfashi town
of Katsina State.29 Death sentence (by stoning) has been imposed on
two women: Safiya Husaini in Sokoto State and Amina Lawal in Katsina
State. Both judgments were, however, overturned by Shari>‘a Courts of
Appeal in the two states. The success of  the appeal was partly the
result of  campaigns by activist constituencies of  human rights, women’s
rights, democracy promotion, local and international non-governmental
–––––––––––––––––
27 Peters, Reintroduction of  Islamic Criminal Law, pp. 13 ff.
28 Phillip Ostien, “Islamic Criminal Law: What it means in Zamfara and Niger
States,” Journal of  Public and  Private Law, vol. 4 (2000), no 4, pp. 1-35.
29 Peters, Reintroduction of  Islamic Criminal Law, p. 14. For more details on other
cases in shari’a court, see: Baobab, Sharia in Nigeria: The Journey So Far, http://
www.baobabwomen.org/publications_womenshr.htm, (2003). Accessed on May 26,
2007, pp.10-20.
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organizations, the European Union, embassies of  Western countries
in Nigeria, and local and international media commentators. As
developments in Nigeria unfolded, these different sets of actors
mobilized personnel, discourses, and resources that made the difference
in the final disposition of  the two cases.
Since Muslim women are the majority of those prosecuted
according to the new Islamic codes, non-governmental organizations
for women’s rights have had no option but to study Islamic law in
order to mount effective defense of the poor Muslim women who found
themselves in court facing charges of illicit sex. Safiyya Husaini and
Amina Lawal are poor and uneducated rural women who could not
make the kind of intellectual odyssey that Mernissi did; instead, they
were rescued by non-governmental organizations for women’s human
rights. BAOBAB For Women’s Human Rights is one of  the most prominent
non-governmental organizations that spearheaded the defense in court
of the two accused women. A defense team comprising several lawyers,
Islamic scholars, and women’s rights activists were able to overturn
the conviction condemning the two women to death, on account of
their successful legal strategy of  marshalling arguments from classical
manuals of  Islamic law, and from Nigeria’s law and constitution—see
below for analysis of the legal arguments that won the appeal.
 Following the Mernissi strategy of  searching the Islamic
intellectual heritage for empowering discourses to address gender
inequality and injustice was not too difficult for BAOBAB, given its
origins from “an ad hoc group of activists, social scientists, lawyers,
and specialists in Muslim laws and Arabic who were responsible for
executing the Women and Laws Nigeria Project, under the auspices of
the International Solidarity Network of  Women Living Under Muslim
Laws [WLUML] from 1993 to 1996.” At the end of the project the
research team mopped into an NGO that adopts the mission of
promoting “women’s human rights principally via improving knowledge,
exercise and development of rights under religious laws, customary
laws and statutory laws.”30 For over a decade now, Baobab’s activism
has included wide-ranging interventions in Muslim public discourses
–––––––––––––––––
30 http://www.baobabwomen.org/history.htm Accessed on April 30, 2007.
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in Nigeria via publications on ways of  promoting Muslim women’s
human rights within Islamic law, raising public awareness and advocacy
in the public policy arena as well as taking the legal defense of Muslim
women prosecuted for illicit sex under the newly enacted shari’a penal
codes. In all these cases, BAOBAB has shown a remarkable ability to
mine the rich intellectual heritage of Islam for ideas to support more
effective advocacy for Muslim women’s human rights, as clearly
demonstrated in Women’s Rights in Muslim Laws: A Resource Document,
published by Baobab in 2005.
The authors hope to counteract the troubling prevalence of
Mernissi’s predicament in Nigeria where “the mere mention of  the
word shari>‘a seems to render all policies and legislation above scrutiny
or criticism, whatever their content.”31  Against the widespread
perception that shari>‘a is the law directly given by God, the authors set
themselves to demonstrate that “whilst religious laws may be based
on divine revelations, they are necessarily also man-made, historical
and social products, and therefore changeable.”32 They achieve this
goal by highlighting the several ways humans construct the enforceable
rules of  the shari>‘a. Most notably, the version of  Islamic law applied in
Nigeria is the Maliki interpretation, which takes its name from its
founding figure, Imam Malik b. Anas; the same is true for three other
Sunni interpretations also named after their founders, i.e. Hanafi, Shafi’i
and Hanbali. Each of these four accepted interpretations of Islamic
law “has variations according to the cultural, political, and socio-
economic contexts in which they were developed and the philosophy
of reasoning that was accepted.” None of these interpretations of
Islamic law existed at the time of Qur’an revelation during the life
time of the Prophet, and given the undeniable roles of the individual
jurists in formulating these interpretations, it follows logically that “the
laws they outline are clearly not direct divine revelations from God.
Instead, they are laws developed through human judicial reasoning
–––––––––––––––––
31 Ayesha M. Imam, Mufuliat Fijabi, and Hurera Akilu-Atta, Women’s Rights in
Muslim Laws: A Resources Document, (Lagos: Baobab for Women’s Human Rights, 2005),
p. 14.
32 Ibid. p. 14.
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(ijtiha>d, in Arabic).”33 For our authors, demonstrating clearly the active
roles of  men (often excluding women) in formulating and interpreting
rules of  Islamic law is very important for enabling critical discussions
of the recent legislative enactments of shari’a penal law in Nigeria,
and also for challenging the notion that any criticisms of the
contemporary fundamentalist interpretations of Islamic law is
tantamount to questioning God’s law—thereby giving advanced
rebuttals to the anticipated quick resort to death fatwas.
For the Baobab authors, it is equally important to call attention
to the diversity and variations of juristic opinions within shari’a that
are very well recognized in the classical manuals  of  Islamic law,
including the ones invoked in both the legislative enactments and the
judicial rulings in Nigeria. Highlighting this salient point enables the
authors to challenge effectively the claims that there is only one true
version of absolutely correct Muslim laws that should never be
examined critically; moreover this point also advocates implicitly the
validity of making different choices within the diversity of the variously
accepted interpretations of the shari’a. One obvious choice should
focus on possibilities of  protecting women’s rights within the classical
manuals of  Islamic law, even though they bear the significant patriarchal
influences of  their historical origins. Making this point sufficiently clear
is a good critique against the secularist activists who regard Islamic
law as part of  the problem for women’s rights, and the Islamophobia
often hiding behind calls to liberate Muslim women from their allegedly
oppressive religion. The Baobab document shows that improved
religious literacy can be effective response to the hegemonic politics
of religious revival, which seems to demand subordination of women
as a necessary tenet of Islam.
The main contentions summarized above are illustrated with
reference to Qur’an 4:3, which states: “And if  ye fear that ye will not
deal fairly by the orphans, marry of the women, who seem good to
you, two or three or four; and if ye fear that ye cannot do justice (to so
many) then one (only) or (the captives) that your right hands possess.
Thus it is more likely that ye will not do injustice.” The authors remark
–––––––––––––––––
33 Ibid, pp. 18-19.
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that the first important point to note is that the verse says polygamy is
allowed but not required; equally important are the specific conditions
of fairness and equal treatment required before marrying more than
one wife at a time. Next, the authors observe that the circumstances
within which the verse was revealed were in the aftermath of  the Battle
of Uhud when many Muslim men lost their lives, leaving their
womenfolk without providers in the Arabian tribal society where “few
women and children had independent access to resources and therefore
needed to have a claim for maintenance on a man through kinship or
marriage.” This short reference to asba>b al-nuzu>l is interesting but not
well developed; it is one of the few doctrines alluding to branches of
Islamic thought apart from the main focus on fiqh.
Pursuing their analysis of  the verse on polygamy, authors observe
that different Muslim scholars have argued that the stringent conditions
stipulated are impossible to meet; hence the verse effectively outlaws
polygamy. Yet others have argued that even if  the verse is not so
interpreted, monogamy is certainly the model preferred. The authors
highlight various laws and policies on polygamy in different Muslim
countries, ranging from prohibition in Tunisia to the expectation
prevalent in Nigeria that Muslims should practice polygamous marriage
in order to follow the exemplary practice of Prophet Muhammad. In-
between the two extremes are diverse laws allowing polygamy but only
under court supervision (Malaysia), when each wife is provided with a
separate residence (Sudan), or permitted but not encouraged or expected
(India). By documenting these interpretations of Quran 4:3 and
juxtaposing the different laws, policies and practices on polygamy, the
point becomes undeniable: “What is assumed to be Muslim in one
community may be unknown, or even be considered un-Islamic, in
other Muslim communities.”34
These critical engagements with the classical doctrines of Islamic
law reveal the centrality of  human interpretation in constructing the
rules of  Islamic law in many different ways, including significantly
limiting or even prohibiting what the text of the Qur’an says is allowed.
Once empowered by knowledge of diversity and variety within Islamic
–––––––––––––––––
34 Ibid., 11-13.
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law, Baobab activists can now mount forceful rebuttals against the
intimidating charges of  apostasy, silencing dissent, and squelching
alternative views by selective resort to Islamic classics, takfi>r and death
fatwas—as earlier noted.35 Having thus solved the problem of
inadequate knowledge of Islam that made many Muslims not confident
enough to criticize politicized application of Islamic law in
contemporary Nigeria, Baobab can now hope to draw more activists
to promotion and defense of  women’s human rights through active
participation in policy advocacy, coalition-building, and public
enlightenment campaigns, where Baobab can deploy its newly acquired
intellectual capital against its adversaries, most notably religious
fundamentalists.
For example, in November 2006, BAOBAB held a national
conference to commemorate its tenth anniversary. The conference’s
theme was “The Challenges of Religious Fundamentalisms and
Globalization to Women’s Human Rights,” and was attended by
participants from media, human rights organizations, philanthropic
organizations, embassies and government agencies.36 The conference
communiqué states that among the objectives of the conference was
to analyze the “emerging trends of religious fundamentalism” and
“widening the debate on women’s rights and religion by bringing in
perspectives that reflect the situation of women under the major
religions in Nigeria.” The participants commented on several issues
relating to Islamic law, notably: “That much as it has suffered obvious
distortions and misinterpretations, Islamic family law is replete with
provisions that enhance, rather than disempower women in the pursuit
of  rights.” The participants also observe that “there is a wide range of
difference between what the law stipulates or requires, what the
operators of the law are saying, what the learned are interpreting, and
what the followers practice.” These insightful observations point to
the growing popularization of a more sophisticated conception of
–––––––––––––––––
35 Ayesha Imam “Fighting the Political Abuse of Religion in Nigeria,” WLUML
2004, 127.
36 Baobab communiqué of  the National Discussion on Women’s Human Rights
and Religion, available at http://www.wluml.org/english/newsfulltxt.shtml?
cmd%5B157%5D=x-157-546798. Accessed on March 13, 2007.
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Islamic law that is also more fully aware of its richness and flexibility
than the narrower and less informed conceptions often paraded by the
so-called shari’a proponents.
E. Women’s Access to Justice in Shari>‘a Courts
Heinrich Boll Foundation (HBF), another non-governmental
organization actively engaged with the issues arising from recent
developments in the application of Islamic law in Nigeria, seek ways
to refocus public discourses on shari>‘a by de-escalating tensions and
redirecting debates away from divisive issues and exclusive attention
on criminal law only.37 Boll Foundation supports the “Shari >‘a
Information and Documentation Project” (SIDOP), based in Kano
for “collecting and disseminating Sharia-related information under the
aegis of  experienced social scientists,” and  also providing “a focal
point for debates about the wider societal impacts of the Sharia in
Northern Nigeria.”38 The objectives of SIDOP includes: provision and
distribution of  “empirical, truthful and balanced information about
the Sharia, its implementation, and the human rights situation in
Northern Nigeria,” de-escalation of  “politicized sharia debate in
Nigeria,” and “to  place human rights concerns—rather than identity
politics and power tussles—back into the focus of public attention, as
societies draw upon religious and traditional foundations to define their
future.”39
In bringing supporters and critics of shari>‘a implementation “into
dialogue with each other,” Boll Foundations seeks to highlight what it
thinks are the issues that really matter: “How can the introduction of
shari>‘a improve social conditions and justice? How can access to
justice—especially for women and disadvantaged groups—be
improved? How can we be sure that internationally accepted human
rights standards are adhered to in the administration of shari>‘a justice?”
This view is expressed in publication of papers and proceedings of
“constructive dialogue about shari>‘a in Nigeria” via conferences and
–––––––––––––––––
37 http://www.boellnigeria.org/index.html, Accessed on May 20, 2007
38 http://www.boellnigeria.org/sidop.html, Accessed on May 28, 2007
39 Ibid.
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seminars, the participants of which have included “experts of public
and Islamic law, judges at High and Shari>‘a courts, and members of
Nigerian and international human and women’s rights groups.”40 In these
respects, the Boll Foundation finds common ground with some Muslims
who have faulted the exclusive focus on reinstating the h}udu>d
punishments, without first seeking to establish an Islamic socio-political
order, which can then be defended and protected by the stringent rules
of  Islamic law.
In February 2003, the Boll Foundation supported a conference
on the theme of  “women’s access to justice under shari>‘a in Northern
Nigeria.” WACOL (Women’s Aid Collective) and WARD (Women
Advocates Research and Documentation) are two women’s rights
NGOs that collaborated with the Department of Public Law of
Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, to organize the conference in Abuja.
Against the background of an earlier strategic conference on Islamic
Legal System and Women’s Rights held in October 2002, this
conference assessed and evaluated the implementation of shari>‘a penal
laws and justice system in Northern Nigeria, and its impact on women’s
human rights with the aim of  determining issues, challenges and
prospects in the protection of  women’s rights and guaranteeing access
to justice under the shari>‘a. The objectives of the conference were “to
make concrete suggestions and outline strategies on how to promote,
protect and ensure women’s rights under shari>‘a justice system; to
strengthen networking for social and legislative advocacy for the
promotion of  women’s rights in Islamic societies; and to improve
women’s access to justice through exchange of  information.” The
participants at the conference—Muslim women groups, NGOs, Islamic
jurists, judges, legal practitioners, and other intellectuals from Nigeria
and abroad—made important observations regarding the potentials
of  protecting women’s rights within the framework of  Islamic law. In
–––––––––––––––––
40 For example, see: Sheik U.D. Keffi “Improving the Quality of  Life of  Muslims
through the Implementation of the Socio-economic Aspects of the Sharia in Nigeria,”
in J. Ngozi Ezeilo, Muhammad T. Ladan and Abiola A. Akiyode (eds.),  Sharia
Implementation in Nigeria: Issues and Challenges on Women’s Rights and Access to Justice,
(Abuja and Lagos: Women’s Aid Collective and Women Advocates Research and
Documentation Center, 2003), pp. 207-27.
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this regard, the following remarks are particularly revealing:
“Shari>‘a legal system recognizes and safeguards women’s rights and
access to justice as human beings … Ignorance about Islamic law by
women is the biggest threat to their rights and access to justice under
the shari>‘a…. Education and enlightenment of the populace and those
that implement shari>‘a is important for a proper implementation of
Islamic legal system … Under Islamic legal system, there is no deliberate
policy of bias against women. However, with regard to protecting
rights and securing access to justice for women, it is necessary to prevent
biases borne out of cultural, personal, or selfish reasons or even
ignorance….41
Following logically from their observations, the participants
recommended that there should be “Improvement of women education
and enlightenment about their rights as enshrined in shari>‘a, … [via]
establishing effective mechanisms for communicating women’s
interests and concerns, establishing institutions that will further enable
women to access justice, such as legal aid services, and access  to
counsel without any distinctions.” Furthermore, the participants also
recommended:
“Shari>‘a implementing states should intensify efforts in continuous
training of Alkalis or judges on matters of shari>‘a, especially on
procedure and evidence, in institutions of higher learning, for effective
performance of  their duties, including adequate funding.... Shari>‘a
implementing states should take positive steps toward implementing
the socio-economic components of shari>‘a. The Conference specifically
recommends the establishment of the powerful Islamic “Mazalim”
institution to tackle complaints against official misdeeds, including
corruption and official breach of trust. … In view of daily challenges,
Nigerian Muslim jurists should embark on improvement of
implementation of shari>‘a through the process of “ijtihad” (independent
reasoning).42
–––––––––––––––––
41 “Three-Day Conference on Women’s Rights and Access to Justice under Shari’a
in Northern Nigeria,” Organized by Women’s Aid Collective (WACOL) and Women
Advocates Research and Documentation Center (WARDC) in collaboration with the
Department of  Public Law, Ahmadu Bello University (ABU), Zaria, with support
from the Heinrich Boll Foundation at Rockview Hotel , Abuja on February 25-28, 2003,
p. 1.
42 Ibid., p. 2.
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With women’s rights organizations actively promoting and
advocating these views, it has become impossible to maintain a
monolithic view of Islamic law in the public discourses in Nigeria.
One positive consequence of this healthy development can be seen in
translating these calls for promoting and defending women’s human
rights into specific arguments in court where particular individual
women were charged with illicit sex, punishable by stoning to death
upon conviction. Let us explore this point by analyzing the judgments
in the two internationally celebrated cases.
F. Shari>‘a Courts Judgments
In the two cases of Safiyya Husaini (2002) and Amina Lawal
(2003), different Shari>‘a Courts of Appeal from Katsina State and the
Sokoto State set aside the judgments of lower Shari>‘a Courts that have
earlier convicted the two women of  the offence of  zina>, and sentenced
them to death by stoning, as stipulated in the newly enacted shari>‘a
codes. Careful analysis of  these judgments reveals several important
points, three of  which deserve more detailed attention here, namely:
the complexities of applying Islamic law in the contemporary nation-
state of Nigeria; the link between the judgments delivered and the
contentious politics of  application of  Islamic law, including the critical
discourses generated by women’s rights organizations in Nigeria and
in many locations around the globe; and the doctrines of Islamic law
that won in court.
The most notable aspects of the complexities of applying Islamic
law in the context of contemporary nation-state of Nigeria is the legal
pluralism that involves three different legal orders, namely: Islamic
law, indigenous African laws of  different tribes and ethnic groups, and
the Nigeria’s public law derived largely from British Common Law
inherited from colonial period. These legal orders have increasingly
become linked, particularly through the institutional imperatives of
judicial administration, including organization of courts according to
modern bureaucratic standards, recording of court proceedings in the
form case-law reports, and most importantly, the doctrine of  supremacy
of  Nigeria’s constitution over all other laws. Awwalu Yadudu argues
convincingly that the imposition of British common law traditions has
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transformed the form and substance of  Islamic law as applied in
Nigerian courts.43 Aspects of  this transformation are quite clear in the
two judgments of the Shari>‘a Courts of Appeal from Sokoto and
Katsina States. The judges insist on upholding the supremacy of  the
1999 constitution, which prohibits retroactive application of any
criminal law, and also requires that crimes and their punishments must
be defined by a written law before anyone could be convicted of such
crimes. This constitutional norm means that zina> was not an offence
before the Sharia Penal Codes of Sokoto and Katsina States were duly
passed into law c. 2000-2002 by the respective legislative and executive
authorities of  the two states. The fact that h}udu>d punishments have
been part of Islamic law for centuries does not matter in light of the
constitutional prohibition of  retroactive legislations. One of  the
grounds of appeal upheld by the Qadis in the Amina Lawal case was
the failure of  the lower Shari>‘a Courts to observe the requirements for
the proper constitution of the court as stipulated in the recent
legislation.
But while the learned Qadis of the Shari>‘a Courts of Appeal
scrupulously adhered to statutory law, they were equally scrupulous—
or even more so—in insisting that the lower Shari>‘a Courts were bound
by all the elaborate stipulations of the classical manuals of Islamic
law for conviction of  zina>, including four irreproachable eye-witnesses
to the actual sexual intercourse which they are certain was not lawful,
as well as providing the accused with full and comprehensive
explanation of  the legal meaning of  zina> as technically defined in Islamic
law, i.e. sexual intercourse that lacks any semblance of  legality. The
failure of the lower Shari>‘a Courts in these two respects was one of
the reasons for setting aside their judgments and allowing the appeal
to succeed.44 The insistence that lower Shari>‘a Courts were bound by
–––––––––––––––––
43 Awwalu H. Yadudu, “Colonialism and the Transformation of  the Substance
and Form of  Islamic Law in Northern Nigeria,” Journal of  Law and Religion, 9 (1991), pp.
12-47.
44 See: The Law Reporting Committee, “Amina Lawal V. The State, Shari’a Court
of Appeal Katsina,” in Law Report of Nigeria 2003, (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University
Press, 2004), pp. 495 ff. Cf. ruling in “Safiyya Husaini v. Attorney General of  Sokoto
State,” reported in Women’s Aid Collective (WACOL) Safiyyatu’s Case, (2003), pp. 20 ff.
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all the requirements for conviction arising from statutory Shari>‘a Penal
Codes passed by Sokoto and Katsina States, the upholding the
supremacy of  the 1999 constitution of  the Federal Republic of  Nigeria,
as well as the adherence to medieval doctrines of Islamic law are clear
pointers to the virtual convergence of Islamic law and the public law
of the modern nation-state of Nigeria. It seems certain that one could
not win a case in the Shari>‘a Courts without adhering to certain aspects
of  the two different but converging legal orders.
It obvious that pressures from different political constituencies
may have been exerted on the Shari>‘a Courts of Appeal that discharged
and acquitted Safiyya Husaini and Amina Lawal. As earlier discussed,
many state governors were virtually stampeded into implementing
shari>‘a in the states through tremendous political pressure that could
not have escaped the attention of  the learned Appeal Qadis. Political
pressure against application of shari >‘a, particularly the h}udu>d
punishments, came from 1) the Federal Government of  Nigeria, 2) the
local human rights and women rights non-governmental organizations,
and their international partners, and 3) governments of  some Western
countries, whose ambassadors in Nigeria made public statement of
their opposition, including formal condemnation of  carrying out of
the h}udu>d amputation and lashing in Zamfara State. Although different
from each other, these three sources of political pressure against
application of Islamic law were all connected in basing their oppositions
on human rights doctrines whether in the form enshrined in the 1999
constitution of the Nigeria, or in the international treaties and covenants
ratified by Nigeria and therefore making the country liable in
international law, or in the public diplomacy of  Western countries. The
strategies of exerting political pressure against shari>‘a application also
varied. The Federal Government of  Nigeria preferred arm-twisting of
governors of shari>‘a states behind-the-scene, while the local human
rights and women’s right non-governmental organizations assembled a
team of lawyers and experts in Islamic law to defend the accused
women in the Shari>‘a courts, invoking both Islamic law and Nigeria’s
public law. The defense team utilized the opposition from Nigerian
Muslim liberals who publicly faulted several aspects of the judgments
delivered by the lower Shari>‘a Courts in the Safiyya Husaini and Amina
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Lawal cases; they were also very vocal in pointing the opportunism in
the politics of applying the shari>‘a and fact that the Shari>‘a Penal Codes
were heavily stacked against women and poor Muslims while allowing
influential Muslim elites to escape prosecution of  corruption and the
stern punishment of h}udu>d.
An interesting aspect of the politics that brought pressure against
application of h}udu>d can be seen in the problem that developed when
local women’s rights resorted to mobilizing their international partners
who waged an international campaign for petition against application
of h}udu>d in Nigeria. When the international campaign began to snowball
into Islamophobia, it became a counter-productive liability that the
local non-governmental organizations had to call for ending the
international campaign.45 In addition to public protestations by Western
embassies in Nigeria, there was also a formal resolution from the
European Union Parliament against the h}udu>d sentences.46 As if  all
these outcries and denunciations were not enough, the international
media sensationalism that invaded the relative anonymity of remote
towns and rural communities in northern Nigeria must have added to
the already tremendous pressure on the qadis of the Shari>‘a Courts of
Appeal to find all possible ways to discharge and acquit the two hapless
women in the eye of  the storm, thereby de-escalating the tension that
has been building both locally and internationally and at the same time
averting the unwanted scrutiny from hostile quarters.
The unenviable task of the Appeal Qadis was made somewhat
easier by a combination of factors, most notably the complexities of
applying Islamic law in the modern nation-state of Nigeria as discussed
already, and the rich flexibility of  the doctrines of  classical Islamic
law. Any failure to meet strict evidentiary requirements for conviction
of  zina> can easily lead to discharge of  the accused. Furthermore, even
if all the elaborate requirements were present, they accused could still
avoid conviction by raising shubha, i.e. doubt on any aspect of the
–––––––––––––––––
45 BAOBAB, “Implementation of  the Sharia in Nigeria: The Journey So far,”
pp. 30-34.
46 European Union/Nigeria: Resolution on human rights situation in Nigeria;
http://www.wluml.org/english/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd%5B157%5D=x-157-3334
Accessed on May 28, 2007.
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incriminating evidence presented in court. In Islamic law, it is acceptable
for an accused to withdraw confession of guilt made in earlier stage.
When Amina Lawal withdrew her previous confession of  zina>—one
of the two evidentiary bases of her conviction—she introduced shubha
into the evidence against her, and thereby creating a basis for discharge
and acquittal. The arguments for discharge became even strong when
another shubha was introduced concerning her pregnancy outside of
marriage—the second evidence for her conviction in the lower Sharia
courts. In Islamic law the concept of  dormant pregnancy means that
any child born within less than five years after divorce legally belongs
to the previous marriage. The fact that Amina Lawal’s daughter was
born only two years after her divorce means that the baby could legally
belong to her previous husband. Thus with doubt hanging on the two
evidentiary bases of her conviction, enough shubha has been created
for the Qadis of the Shari>‘a Court of Appeal to avert the punishment
of  h}add for zina> since according to a well-known tradition of  the Prophet
Muhammad, h}udu>d punishment should be avoided even if by raising
shubha.47
A number of procedural errors committed by the lower Shari>‘a
Courts also worked to the advantage of the accused. First, the doctrine
of i zar requires that the qadi should give the accused an opportunity
to say anything that could help to avert conviction, but this was not
properly observed by the judges of  the lower Shari>‘a Courts. According
to the judges of the Shari>‘a Court of Appeal, it was not acceptable in
Islamic law for police, or anyone for that matter, to start inquiry into
the conduct of an individual in order to collect evidence for indictment;
the judges held this to be a violation of Islamic legal protection of the
privacy of the individual.48
G. Conclusion
By critical engagement with the classical manuals of  Islamic law,
women rights activists have discovered the centrality of human agency
in constructing Islamic law in many different ways, including limiting
–––––––––––––––––
47 “Amina Lawal v The State,” p.503-505.
48 “Safiyya Husaini v. Attorney General of  Sokoto State,” p. 30.
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what the Qur’an allows. Working mainly within the narrow confines
of fiqh, women have now acquired the valuable knowledge of the
incredible variety and diversity in Islamic Law; they have also stumbled
upon other aspects of classical intellectual traditions of Islam that
arguably offer even more compelling evidence of both human agency
and diversity within Islamic thought in general. These include doctrine
of circumstances of revelation from  Ulu>m al-Qur’a>n; criticism of chain
of narrators and text of h}adi>th from  Ulu>m al-H{adi>th; and sources of
Islamic law being not confined to the Qur’an and Prophetic Sunnah,
but also more clearly human sources such as the ijtiha>d of the individual
jurists and consensus of  the scholars. To specialists of  Islamic Studies,
these ideas are well known, but for Muslim without advanced
knowledge of Islam, these ideas are eye-openers to the rich flexibility
of classical Islam, which is quite different from the rigid understandings
of  Islam being advocated by contemporary extremists and militants.
In Morocco and Nigeria and many other Muslim counties
women’s rights are being debated, contested and defended in
contemporary Islamic discourses by actively engaging with the classical
heritage of Islamic thought rather than rejecting it, or simply ignoring
it. The emerging field of  Islamic Feminism or Gender Jihad is perhaps the
most likely beneficiary of the increasing awareness of the richness of
classical Islamic thought; but that richness can also enhance all sides
in the contemporary debates on wide range of issues concerning
Muslims as ordinary citizens of a modern state. In all these political
engagements and intellectual encounters, classics of Islamic thought
offer vast discursive resources to advocate and defend the legitimacy
of not only the fundamentalist or extremist positions, but also tolerant
and accommodating positions as well.
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